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8.1  Introduction 
Bolivia is a landlocked and sparsely populated nation of  South America. 
With an area the size of the United Kingdom, Germany, and France combined, 
Bolivia had by  1989 a population of  only 7 million. The country is divided 
into three clearly differentiated geographical areas. The western portion of the 
country is a flat plateau at 12,600 feet above sea level. This area is mineral- 
rich and historically has been the political and economic center of the country. 
Known as the ultipluno, this region includes the departments of La Paz, Oruro, 
and Potosi. East of the altiplano lies the vulks (valleys), an intermediate region 
between the high Andean ridge and the precordillera. At 8,500 feet above sea 
level the area is rich in agricultural products and comprises the departments of 
Cochabamba, Chuquisaca, and Tarija. This region also contains the famed re- 
gion of the ChaparC, one of the best in the world for the production of coca leaf. 
As a consequence this region has recently been a strong receptor of population, 
particularly from the altiplano (see Pereira, Montano, and Calle 1991).  Finally, 
east of the valles lies the extensive (and mainly still unexploited) area of the 
lowlands, or Elunos. With a thriving economic center at Santa Cruz, this area 
has increasingly become a major economic and political center for the country. 
The extensive department of Santa Cruz, together with the northern, selvatic, 
cattle-growing regions of El Beni and Pando, conform this region. 
Table 8.1 shows Bolivia’s interregional disparities and underscores two im- 
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Table 8.1  Bolivia’s Regional Disparities 
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Source: Ministerio de Planeamiento y Coordinacion (1989) 
portant characteristics of the Bolivian economy. First, Bolivia remains a very 
poor country. With a per capita income of US$630  in  1990, it ranked lowest 
among all South American economies. Second, Bolivia presents striking in- 
come disparities across regions. Notice from table 8.1 that the intraregional 
disparity in income is substantially lower than the interregional differences. 
While these disparities have found response in labor migration, the economy 
remains to some extent segmented along the lines of its geographical division. 
This of course is fundamental in evaluating the ability of the economy to adjust 
to shocks. 
Bolivia has been, and to a great extent still is, a mining country. Develop- 
ment of mining products is among the main reasons both Incas and Spaniards 
were interested in the region. An analysis of productivity and growth potential 
can by no means be separated from the mining issue. Mining has historically 
been the main source of foreign exchange and savings for the country, a point 
first emphasized by Eder (1968). Not surprisingly, the recent collapse in Boliv- 
ia’s mineral markets has had a major impact on Bolivia’s economy. 
Bolivia also brings to mind political instability, with twenty-one presidents 
since  1952. Between  1979 and  1982, nine presidents held office, a mere 4- 
month average tenure! Even the period between 1960 and 1980, which is con- 
sidered a period of relative political  tranquility, experienced eight coups and 
thirteen  presidents.  In section 8.2 I will show that the econometric link be- 
tween political instability and growth is weak. Still I argue that this will not be 
enough to disregard the role of political instability as detriment to growth. 
More recently, Bolivia has become  an  important coca-producing  country 
with a large sector of the economy completely separate from that of the formal 
(and legal) economy. Samuel Doria Medina (1986) estimates for 1985 that the 
informal GNP was actually larger than that of the formal sector. He estimates 
an informal GNP of US$3,147 million, while that of the formal sector was 241  Bolivia: From Stabilization to What? 
$3,055 million.'  He also finds that the total  and relative importance of  coca 
production was growing very significantly until the end of the study in 1985. 
While in 1980 the value added associated with the production of cocaine was 
$353 million, by  1985 this figure had reached US$2 billion. Considering that 
the price of cocaine has fallen by half during the same period, it is clear that 
there has been a strong shift in factors of production (land, capital, and labor) 
toward this sector during the last decade. If the informal sector of the economy 
remains rather constant, at least for some computations, one could presume 
that use of the formal sector data should not strongly bias the results. Unfortu- 
nately, this presumption  is not  necessarily  true. An increase in the inflation 
rate, for example, is a major incentive to avoid the formal sector, usually char- 
acterized by  longer contracting periods and payment intervals. Below I try to 
adjust for this component where I think that misleading results would other- 
wise obtain. Unfortunately,  lack of  reliable  data requires making heroic as- 
sumptions. 
In summary, any analysis of Bolivia's growth performance has to cope with 
these issues: the role of mining, the low level of income, the role of political 
instability,  and  coca  production  and  the  informal  sector.  I  study, first,  the 
growth experience since the early 1950s. I try to uncover the driving forces of 
growth in Bolivia and then, from understanding such forces, to derive implica- 
tions for future policy action. 
Bolivia is a country of paradoxes. These go beyond geographical contrasts 
to the reign of politics, its interplay with macroeconomics and growth. After 
the Chaco war of the 1930s, the country entered an economic slide that trig- 
gered in the early 1950s a revolutionary movement with a socialist orientation, 
led by the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR) and headed by  the 
caudillos Victor Paz Estenssoro and Hemin Siles Zuazo. The revolution came 
to power with a clear socialist platform, implemented an agricultural reform, 
and  nationalized  mining  production.  Victor  Paz Estenssoro  was  appointed 
president and immediately embarked on an expansionist spending program. 
Only a few years later the country was in a situation of increasing inflation and 
general economic disorder.2 Hemin Siles Zuazo, sworn in as president in 1956, 
in order to cope with inflation implemented a very strict fiscal austerity and 
rationalization program, which with external supervision quickly put inflation 
under control. These reforms were the prelude to a long period of stability and 
high growth, which lasted until the early 1980s. 
The late 1970s and early 1980s saw the collapse of a boom in mineral prices, 
which had allowed Bolivia to increase its standard of living significantly. The 
fall in the international price of  tin was closely followed by the onset of the 
I. The Dona Medina estimate is considered to be, at best, an upper bound for the amount of 
2. See Eder (1968) for an incisive account of both the economic reality and policy making in 
coca production. I discuss this issue in detail below. 
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Fig. 8.1  Output per capita 
Source: Data from Juan Antonio Morales, based on information provided by Banco 
Central de Bolivia and Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas. 
international debt crisis. With increased impoverishment of the economy, the 
political struggle and the redistributive conflict intensified so that the military 
delegated power to a democratically elected government. The new democratic 
regime, headed once again by Hernan Siles Zuazo, was responsible for dealing 
with the strong adjustment that international markets were imposing on the 
Bolivian economy. Unfortunately, in spite of six stabilization attempts during 
his presidency (see Morales 1988), the underlying causes of Bolivian inflation 
were not tackled. This eventually resulted in the most traumatic experience 
of  Bolivian modern history, as the economy hit hyperinflation by mid-1985. 
Hyperinflation  created  the  consensus for a broad  reform  program  that,  in 
a reversal of  roles from the  1950s, was this time put forward by  Victor Paz 
Estens~oro.~  The set of policies implemented and known as “new economic 
policy” (NEP) are well known (see Morales  1991; Morales and Sachs 1989) 
to have quickly brought inflation and fiscal accounts under control. 
Figures 8.1 and 8.2 show (in log scale) output per capita for Bolivia from 
1950 to 1990. Figure 8.1 contains official data only. Figure 8.2 has been ad- 
justed to include the product of Bolivia’s cocaine sector. The size of Bolivia’s 
cocaine  sector  has  been  estimated  for the period  1980-85  (Dona Medina 
3. To  understand why hyperinflation induces the political consensus for reform, see Labin and 
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Fig. 8.2 
Sources: Data from Juan Antonio Morales, based on information provided by Banco 
Central de Bolivia and Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas; Doria Medina (1986). 
Output per capita (informal sector added) 
1986). We  have assumed that this product was zero prior to 1980 and constant 
at the 1985 level for years after 1985. Regarding this last assumption, work by 
Gutierrez and Pando (1989) suggests that the production of coca leaf has re- 
mained constant or has slightly declined. Godoy and De Franco (1990) suggest 
values for 1985 production similar to those of Dona Medina. Serious discrep- 
ancies arise in evaluating the value of this production. Doria Medina uses the 
price of cocaine hydrochlorate, though data from the National Narcotics Intel- 
ligence Consumer Committee (NNICC 1989) suggest that only  15% of  coca 
paste is transformed into cocaine hydrochlorate in Bolivia itself (most of this 
process takes place in Colombia). Godoy and De Franco use instead the price 
of coca paste and obtain estimates roughly one-third of the Doria Medina esti- 
mates for 1987-89.  I have used the Doria Medina numbers because they consti- 
tute a clear upper bound to the estimate range. 
Both figures 8.1 and 8.2 show that the 1950s are characterized by  a fall in 
real income induced by  the social and political convulsion that characterized 
the Bolivian economy during this period. Civil war in 1952 brought the MNR 
to power. Both 1955 and 1956 were years of extreme inflation, the rest of the 
decade being dominated by  a strict austerity program. The country then experi- 
enced steady growth from the early 1960s to the early 1980s. Growth halted 
in the  1980s as prices of  tin collapsed, the debt crisis started, and inflation 
picked up. The stabilization attempt of  1985 was considered a major step to- 244  Federico A. Sturzenegger 
ward recovering growth. As shown by the two graphs, this hope has not been 
validated by the facts; this paper examines why. 
In section 8.2 I review the main factors contributing to Bolivia’s economic 
growth. In section 8.3 I take the main elements identified in the empirical anal- 
ysis and develop a model that I hope provides a unifying framework for the 
discussion of  terms of  trade, real exchange rates, optimal taxation, and coca 
production and its relation to growth. In section 8.4 I discuss the theoretical 
and empirical relation between inflation and growth. In section 8.5 I discuss 
the relation between structural reform and poststabilization productivity. After 
computing productivity for specific industrial sectors for the poststabilization 
period, I conclude that improvement in productivity has been sluggish. In sec- 
tion 8.6 I discuss other possible explanations for Bolivia’s recent poor growth 
performance, a puzzling result given that it constitutes a “model” case of fiscal 
austerity and market liberalization. Section 8.7 contains some policy conclu- 
sions that can be derived from the paper. 
8.2  Sources of Growth 
In this section I identify the main sources for Bolivia’s growth performance 
by looking at the evolution of productivity. In order to study the performance 
of productivity I compute the total factor productivity (TFP) for Bolivia for the 
period 1950-90.  While data are available for measures of the capital stock (see 
Huarachi  1988) and for population,4 information on factor shares in unavail- 
able. I perform the computation  by estimating the shares as in Griliches and 
Ringstad (1971).5 I assume that there exists a production function  with con- 
stant elasticity of substitution and possible nonconstant returns to scale; that is, 
P 
(1)  Y = B[SK-P + (1 -  S)L-p]P, 
where B is an aggregate productivity parameter, K is capital stock, L is employ- 
ment,  represents the elasticity of scale, and u  = 1/(  1 + p) is the elasticity of 
substitution.  In  order  to estimate this  production  function,  Griliches  and 
Ringstad suggest taking a second-order Taylor expansion around p = 0 for a 
log version of equation (1). This gives the equation 
(2)  ln(Y/L) = a, + u,ln L + u2 ln(K/L) + u3  ln(K/L)*. 
From (2) we can obtain estimates for the elasticity of output with respect to 
both factors, labor and capital. a, is a measure of increasing returns to scale. 
Estimates of (2) turned out to be very unstable for the sample periods consid- 
ered. For the sample 1950-87,  equation (2) gives the following result for the 
official data: 
4. Population data are available for the  whole sample. The labor force was computed from 
5. The particular formalization used here allows for nonconstant returns to scale as discussed in 
estimates obtained from census data, interpolating for the intermediate years. 
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5.06  0.49 In  L  3.43 ln(K/L) 
+
 0.57 ln(K/L), 
(0.14)  (0.16)  (7.33)  (1.70)  ’ 
(3)  In(Y/L) = -  +  + 
where standard errors are shown in parentheses. As can be readily observed 
from the standard errors, the coefficients on In (KIL) are very imprecisely esti- 
mated. 
For the data including the informal section I use only the Cobb-Douglas 




 0.65 In  L 
(0.11)  (0.10)  (0.17) 
1.02 ln(K/L) 
ln(Y/L) = -  + 
Notice that the estimates in (4) are favorable to “endogenous growth” theo- 
ries, indicating the presence of increasing returns to scale and an almost con- 
stant capital-output ratio.6 From (3) and (4) we can compute the elasticities 
with respect to capital and labor as E,  = a, + 2a, ln(K/L) and E, = (a,  + 1 - 
a,) -  2u, ln(K/L). And from these we can compute the factor shares as 
and 
(6)  p=1-a. 
An estimate of TFP is then obtained from’ 
(7) 
These estimates for the elasticities (a  and p) and TFP (TFP, corresponds to 
the data that include the informal sector) are presented in the last four columns 
of Table 8.2. The table also shows data for the capitaMabor ratio (ln(K/.t,)), 
employment (ln(L)), output per capita (In( Y/L), official data), and the growth 
rates of output per capita (both for the official data [y,] and with the informal 
sector [y,]).  TFP estimates are plotted in figures 8.3 and 8.4. The estimates 
obtained assign a share to capital of between 55 and 80% for the official data 
case, and of 62% for the data including the informal sector.8 
Figures 8.3 and 8.4 indicate a very clear pattern, with an upward swing in 
productivity that culminates in the early 1980s. Since then the two graphs dis- 
agree, as one omits the effect of  the informal economy. The official figures 
suggest a drastic collapse in the productivity of  the Bolivian economy, down 
by 35% since 1979. Figure 8.4 suggests, on the contrary, a stagnant profile for 
productivity, though with an important fall during the first half of the 1980s. 
6. See, among others, Romer (1986); Rebelo (1991); Lucas (1988); Jones and Manuelli (1990). 
7. Use of  the Cobb-Douglas specification is appropriate  as long as we could not reject the 
8. Certainly my measure of TFP may have several biases. Most important, human capital has 
For a comprehensive survey see Sala-i-Martin (1990a, 1990b). 
hypothesis that u3  = 0. 
been patently excluded from the estimation and therefore is subsumed in the residual term. Table 8.2  Total Factor Productivity and Sources of Growth 
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0.66  0.34  0.18  0.17 
0.66  0.34  0.19  0.18 
0.66  0.34  0.19  0.18 
0.64  0.36  0.17  0.16 
0.63  0.37  0.17  0.16 
0.63  0.37  0.17  0.17 
0.63  0.37  0.16  0.16 
0.63  0.37  0.15  0.15 
0.61  0.39  0.15  0.15 
0.59  0.41  0.14  0.15 
0.57  0.43  0.14  0.15 
0.55  0.45  0.13  0.16 
0.54  0.46  0.14  0.16 
0.54  0.46  0.14  0.17 
0.54  0.46  0.14  0.17 
0.54  0.46  0.15  0.18 
0.50  0.50  0.15  0.20 
0.51  0.49  0.16  0.21 
0.54  0.46  0.18  0.21 
0.55  0.45  0.19  0.22 
0.57  0.43  0.20  0.23 
0.60  0.40  0.22  0.23 
0.64  0.36  0.25  0.24 
0.66  0.34  0.28  0.26 
0.69  0.31  0.30  0.26 
0.72  0.28  0.32  0.26 
0.74  0.26  0.34  0.26 
0.77  0.23  0.36  0.26 
0.81  0.19  0.37  0.26 
0.83  0.17  0.37  0.25 
0.82  0.18  0.35  0.26 
0.82  0.18  0.35  0.25 
0.80  0.20  0.32  0.23 
0.78  0.22  0.29  0.23 
0.76  0.24  0.28  0.23 
0.74  0.26  0.27  0.2.5 
0.71  0.29  0.24  0.26 
0.70  0.30  0.24  0.26 
0.68  0.32  0.23  0.26 
0.70  0.30  0.24  0.25 
0.70  0.30  0.24  0.25 
Sources: Capital stock from Huarachi (1988). Population from International Financial Statistics 
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The figure suggests that the 1985 stabilization brought productivity back to the 
values observed at the beginning of the 1980s. 
In  trying to  understand  the  sources of  productivity,  several  variables  are 
clearly relevant.  Since TFP for Bolivia is a stationary  series (an augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test [three lags] gives a coefficient of  -3.35,  which clearly re- 
jects the hypothesis of unit root), standard econometric techniques are appro- 
priate in this case. In particular for the period  1954-90  and the official data, 
the following regression is perf~rrned:~ 
TFP = 0.1281 -  0.0001~  + 4.6E -  9~'  + 0.00047i:n + 
(6.83)  (-2.23)  (2.16)  (6.92) 
0.0002Zin~  -  0.0076PI. 
(0.39)  (- 1.19) 
The first three variables, the inflation rate, the inflation rate squared, and the 
dollar price of tin, are significant, as indicated by  their corresponding  serial- 
correlation  robust Newey-West  t-statistics. The dollar price of zinc together 
with political instability (PI, understood as the number of changes in executive 
power during a given year), while of correct sign, have no significant effect on 
productivity.I0 Inflation has had a negative effect on productivity; increases in 
the price of tin and zinc have increased productivity. As expected, the coeffi- 
cient on inflation is negative and that on inflation squared is positive, indicating 
that the costs of  inflation do not increase as quickly once inflation has risen to 
high levels. RZ  equals 81%, so that a substantial portion of the movements in 
productivity are accounted for by these few variables." 
I do not find the insignificance of the PI dummy to be very revealing. First, 
it is clear that the political turmoil of the early 1950s and 1980s was associated 
with poor growth performance.  Second, most of the effects of the PI variable 
may be colinear with the inflation rate, as both high inflation and political tur- 
moil come together.  Finally,  it is difficult to capture  the notion  of  political 
instability  with  a  set of  dummies in  a time series  approach.  Cross-section 
growth models have certainly found important effects of many political vari- 
ables on growth performance. I therefore conclude that, in spite of the result, 
9. The inclusion of a trend variable proved insignificant. 
10. Regressions were also performed using a political instability dummy that takes a value of  1 
only when the change in executive power leads to a change in policy; that is, the new power is 
ideologically different than the previous one. The results were similar. 
11. The strong effect of the price of Bolivia's main exports on productivity requires an explana- 
tion. An  example may illustrate the relevant issue. Imagine an economy that produces only an 
internationally traded export: X = F(K,,  L,) valued at price p, in international markets. Nominal 
GNP will then equal Y,  = p,,X,. Consumers in this country purlhase, with the proceeds of exports, 
a commodity basket with a corresponding price index denoted p,; Real GNP equals y, = y,/p,  = 
p,/p,,  F(K,, L,). Notice that the first term, which denotes a relative price effect, enters exactly like 
the TFP index in standard growth models. The result generalizes to allow for domestic production 
of the consumption good. While this measurement problem exists in all estimates of Solow residu- 
als, it appears especially acute for a countly like Bolivia, which relies so heavily on a small subset 
of export products. 249  Bolivia: From Stabilization to What? 
it is very difficult to disregard the hypothesis that political  instability affects 
growth performance negatively. 
When computing the same regression for the data that include the contribu- 
tion of the informal sector, I obtain 
TFP = 0.16 -  0.00004~  + 3.6E -  9~’  + 0.001Tin 
(8.77)  (-2.97)  (3.02)  (2.60) 
+ 0.001Zinc -  0.0043PI. 
(2.92)  (- 1.07) 
Again the standard errors are Newey-West corrected for serial correlation. 
Inference is as above, though the R2  coefficient falls to 62%.‘* 
I have identified two important sources for understanding Bolivia’s growth 
performance: the price of Bolivia’s main exports and the inflation rate. In sec- 
tions 8.3 and 8.4 I discuss each of these in turn. Section 8.3 develops a model 
that reveals the role played by the export of primary products, specifically of 
mining, on growth and relative prices. This primary sector, characterized by 
decreasing returns to scale, is important for growth, as it is the main source of 
foreign exchange used for the purchase of capital goods. While recently several 
nontraditional exports have been increasing in importance (soybeans and natu- 
ral gas among them), it appears that no alternative sector could substitute in 
the role played by mining in the near future. Coca production is an alternative 
source of foreign exchange and is discussed below. 
Section 8.4 discusses the issue of inflation. Stabilization has been consid- 
ered a main asset for the Bolivian economy and a warranty of future growth. I 
analyze in this section how inflation relates to the growth rate of the economy. 
8.3  A Model of the Bolivian Economy 
A distinguishing characteristic of  the Bolivian  economy is its reliance on 
natural resource production for the provision of foreign exchange. Production 
of tin, zinc, and  more recently natural gas has been important in generating the 
external resources required for capital accumulation (see table 8.3). Morales, 
Espejo, and Chavez (1992) document the participation of tin, zinc, and natural 
gas in total exports since 1929 and show this participation has fluctuated be- 
tween 50 and 70% of total exports. When the prices of mineral products and 
12. Econometric problems are more serious for this specification. An augmented Dickey-Fuller 
test for TFP with a coefficient of -  1.83 does not enable rejection of the hypothesis of a unit root. 
Furthermore, when a cointegration test is performed on the residuals of the cointegrating relation, 
the augmented Dickey-Fuller test equals -2.18,  which does not allow rejection of noncointegra- 
tion when compared to the critical values in Engle and Granger (1987) and Engle and Yo0 (1987). 
In order to compare the results with the previous example and because of the low power of unit 
root tests, I feel confident of the results of the regression and have decided to show them here. 
Finally, while a trend was not significant in the TFT equation for official data, this is not the case 
for the current specification. Including a time trend delivers a coefficient of 0.041 with a Newey- 
West coefficient of 5.22. 250  Federico A. Sturzenegger 
Table 8.3  Income from Mining 
% of Government  Revenue  Price of  Tin  Mining 
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Sources: Columns  I  and 4 from Morales, Espejo, and Chavez (1992). Columns 2 and 3 from 
Banco Central de Bolivia, Annual Memory (1990, 1980). 
particularly of tin collapsed in the early 1980s, the Bolivian economy experi- 
enced one of its biggest recessions, a collapse of investment, and acute lack of 
foreign exchange. Bolivia  faced problems with  its foreign debt prior to the 
general onset of the debt crisis; this of  course was a product of the collapse of 
the tin market in 1980.13 
To  understand  the growth potential of  the Bolivian  economy, we need to 
study the implications of this dependence on mining. In the mining sector de- 
creasing returns to scale are bound to appear. If the sector that sustains capital 
accumulation  has  this  characteristic,  growth  eventually  disappears.  As dis- 
cussed in the introduction, both a sectorial and geographical transformation of 
the Bolivian economy have been observed in the last twenty years due to the 
declining productivity of the mining sector. This process of transformation, or 
of movement toward the valles and the llanos, was temporarily halted with the 
mining boom of the late 1970s but has accelerated considerably since then. 
In this section I look at the growth dynamics of an economy dependent on 
13. There is some evidence that after the collapse of tin  markets in late  1985 the fraction of 
exports accounted for by  tin has declined steadily, reaching about  1 I% in  1990. (The decline in 
terms of government resources is even more significant.) See Morales, Espejo, and Chavez (I 992) 
and table 8.3. 251  Bolivia: From Stabilization to What? 
a tradable, decreasing returns-to-scale sector for the provision of foreign ex- 
change. The model accounts for the effect of  the price of minerals on produc- 
tivity and growth. It traces the dynamics of investment and the real exchange 
rate and allows us to study the effects of price shocks on the Bolivian economy. 
The economy is composed by a representative agent that maximizes the util- 
ity function:14 
U = lom  In  ce-0’ dt, 
where c denotes consumption. 
The economy produces two goods with three factors of production. It pro- 
duces a “mineral” product (n  that is exchanged in world markets for an invest- 
ment good at an exogenous international price. It also produces a consumption 
good that is nontradable. This implies that the equilibrium relative price be- 
tween the investment (mineral) good and the consumption good measures the 
real exchange rate. In summary, the possible spending levels of investment are 
given by 
(9)  I = p,T  =  p,A‘(z(l -  +))pM’-P = A(z(1 -  +))pM’-P, 
where A =  A’p,  with A’ an exogenous productivity parameter andp, the rela- 
tive price between the investment and mineral goods. This relation introduces 
a link between export prices of mineral products and productivity. z indicates 
the stock of capital and +  the fraction of the capital stock used for consumption 
purposes. Finally, M indicates the number of “miners,” which we will consider 
fixed and normalized to one. 
Because p < 1, the model indicates that the marginal product of capital is 
not bounded above the value of the discount factor, and growth will eventu- 
ally disappear. 
(10)  z = I -  6z, 
where 6 is the depreciation rate. Finally, consumption is produced with produc- 
tion function 
Capital is accumulated with technology: 
(11)  c = B(+z)%-“, 
where (Y < 1,  and L is the number of “workers,” which we also consider fixed 
and equal to one. Maximization of  (8) subject to the previous constraints can 
be reduced to the dynamic system in (4, z). After simplification the solution 
of this system has first-order conditions 
14. The assumption of  a representative agent basically indicates that distributional issues are 
not important. This of  course is just a first cut; I deal with the issue of  distributional conflict below. 252  Federico A. Sturzenegger 
'  (1 -  +)p+PA~p-'  -  (6 + p -  PS)(l -  4) 
(1 -  P+l  (1 -  P+) 
(12)  += 
and 
(13)  i  = A(z(1 -  +))p  -  6z. 
These two equations are graphed in figure 8.5, which shows that the steady 
state is a saddle and therefore the equilibrium is unique. The relation between 
consumption share and capital is positive: the economy increases consumption 
as it accumulates capital. 
The steady-state solution is given by 
and 
(15) 
Notice that the solution for +  does not depend on the productivity coefficient 
A;  this is a  special characteristic  imposed by assuming log preferences  but 
which has no major implication for the issues at hand. 
From the first-order conditions for capital investment, we obtain an expres- 
sion for the real exchange rate or relative price of tradables to nontradables (4). 
Because capital  is perfectly  mobile,  the return to capital must be equalized 
across the two sectors; this implies 
1 
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so that q decreases with both + and z. The decrease of the real exchange rate 
as a function of the level of capital accumulation is a reflection of the Balassa- 
Samuelson hypothesis on real exchange rate. The tradable sector is more capi- 
tal intensive than the nontradable sector. As development proceeds, real wages 
increase, pushing up the relative price of nontradables. This is true here, with 
the caveat that the change in real wages is induced by an endogenous change 
in relative prices: as relative productivity in the nontradable sector lags behind, 
the relative price of nontradables increases. The response of the real exchange 
rate to + reflects the fact that the allocation of capital to the tradable sector 
increases in its relative price. Along the growing path both (+,  z)  are increas- 
ing, so that the real exchange rate appreciates. 
The model can be used to study the effects of shocks to the economy, such 
as changes in the world price of minerals. Imagine an increase in the price of 
minerals. This will shift both curves in figure 8.5 to the right, with the intersec- 
tion remaining at the same level of + (we have seen the steady-state value does 
not depend on A). As in the new steady state the optimal level of capital and 
productivity have increased and the value of + remains the same, the real ex- 
change rate appreciates. This corresponds to the notion that equilibrium real 
exchange rates respond to terms of  trade (see Edwards  1989). More interest- 
ingly, the model predicts a transition characterized by a fall in + with conver- 
gence to the same value at a higher level of the capital stock. While the real 
exchange  rate appreciates  in the  long run,  notice that in  the  adjustment  to 
higher productivity (or higher prices), the economy shifts resources from con- 
sumption in order to allow for capital accumulation, thus the need for a short- 
run depreciation of the real exchange rate. 
Shocks to the nontradable  sector can also be studied. If  the productivity 
parameter  (B) changes there  will be no effect  on investment  decisions  and 
growth performance (notice that B does not appear in the dynamic equations). 
It will nevertheless  affect the consumption possibilities of nontradables and 
the real exchange rate. 
8.3.1  Endogenous Growth? 
nous growth. For this I assume p = 1. Equations (12) and (13) become 
The previous model can easily be extended to include the cases of endoge- 
&=A6-p 
and 
i = Az(1 -  +) -  Sz. 
The solution is presented  in  figure 8.6,  where  there  will  be steady-state 
growth as long as A -  6 -  p >  0. Because in steady state + = p/A, the equilib- 254  Federico A. Sturzenegger 
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Fig. 8.6  The endogenous growth version 
rium growth rate will equal A -  6 -  p. This model has the attractive feature 
that changes in productivity will affect the growth rate. 
8.3.2  Capital Adjustment 
Independent of accepting a traditional growth model, or the endogenous ver- 
sion presented in section 8.3.1, it will always be the case that changes in pro- 
ductivity are the leading force in inducing changes in the capital accumulation 
process which allows for long-run changes in income per capita. Figure 8.7 
shows the contribution of  capital accumulation to the growth process both for 
the official data and for data including the informal sector. The value is com- 
puted as a,rG/k, where k is the capitalllabor ratio. The graph is interesting be- 
cause it shows that capital accumulation moves at low frequencies. The econ- 
omy presents long intervals, in general over ten years, in which the contribution 
is either positive or negative. The graph shows that capital was a force in eco- 
nomic growth only between  1965 and 1980. During the other years the contri- 
bution was negative; that is, there was a decrease of capital. 
This sluggish adjustment of  capital to productivity  shocks (after the  1956 
stabilization, capital accumulation finally picked up ten years after productivity 
started to increase) arises from several factors: the existence of lags in installa- 
tion, sluggishness in the revision of forecasts about the future economic situa- 
tion, or irreversibility in investment decisions, which gives value to the option 
of waiting before committing investment resources. 
Another reason capital accumulation adjusts so slowly arises from the move- 
ment in tax rates. Table 8.3 shows data on fiscal income accruing from mining 
taxes. The first column shows the fraction of  total government  revenue col- 
lected from mining taxes. The second column computes the same revenue as 255  Bolivia: From  Stabilization to What? 
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a percentage of  GNP. The last three columns indicate the nominal price of tin 
(see also figure 8.12), the share of tin in Bolivia’s exports, and the participation 
of mining in GNP.I5 
These taxes have not been stable: while they were high and positive in the 
1970s, when prices of mineral products were high, they fell drastically in the 
early 1980s, and even more after the collapse of  tin prices in  1985. In  this 
section I try to explain this variability in the tax rates. Trade taxes in developing 
countries have been strongly countercyclical with respect to the evolution of 
international prices. Morales and Sachs (1989) discuss the role of the Bolivian 
public sector as a “shock absorber” for external shocks, but this relation has 
been found for other developing countries as well (see Krueger, Schiff, and 
Valdes  [  19921 for Argentina and Schiff and Valdes [  19921 for a cross section 
of  developing countries). In Bolivia this pattern is clear from the system of 
regalias, in which the tax is computed as a function of the difference between 
world prices and a “presumed cost” set by  the Bolivian Ministry of  Mines. 
When the price increases, so does the implicit tax rate, reducing price variabil- 
ity at the producer level. While the regalias system appears to be providing 
insurance, it does not reduce price fluctuations  for the economy as a whole and 
15. Mineral prices fluctuate considerably. Morales, Espejo, and Chavez (1992) propose an inter- 
vention mechanism in order to reduce variability in real prices. This variability is considered to 
have negative effects by  imposing strong variability in consumption. Morales et al. estimate this 
variability to imply a welfare loss for Bolivia of  the order of 0.7% of GNP per year. 256  Federico A. Sturzenegger 
cannot be considered  insurance  for producers,  who obtain  no return  when 
prices are 10w.I~  In 1991 a new mining tax law was approved that taxes utilities 
of mining companies at a fixed rate. But nothing in the political structure has 
changed to suggest that, if mineral prices increase, the government will not 
once again tax the mining sector with more intensity. 
One possibility for explaining the time variation in the level of transfer relies 
on the political economy structure of the model in section 8.3. The economy 
has three factors of production: capital (used in both sectors), miners (specific 
to the mining sector), and workers (specific to the nontradable, consumption 
sector). While the assumption  that miners cannot move is rather extreme, it 
should be appropriate in the short run. The income for each group can be deter- 
mined  from  the  production  functions  in  competitive  factor  markets.  The 
groups vote for taxing either mining or consumption. Under these assumptions 
it is easy to show that the miners would never vote for taxing the mining sector, 
as they would suffer from the tax and it would reduce in turn the total level of 
the capital  stock. For workers the choice is ambiguous:  A consumption tax 
reduces their income, but a mining tax reduces the capital stock and through 
that channel reduces their income. If they side with miners, the mining sector 
would never get taxed. This is certainly not the case, so we assume the contrary. 
The remaining group is capital owners, who, having  a stake in both  sectors 
of  the economy, can be a shifting coalition depending, for example, on the 
international price of mineral products. If so, the setup works in a way opposite 
to that of the stylized facts previously described.  If  the price of  the mineral 
products increases, capitalists will side with miners (because the tax becomes 
more onerous the higher the price of minerals), and government revenue will 
be levied through other mechanisms such as inflation. This is contrary to the 
evidence. 
An alternative explanation relies on “optimal” taxation approaches. This ap- 
proach can give a better account of the intertemporal change in taxes than the 
political economy explanation. Imagine a policymaker who tries to set up a 
tax policy to maximize the utility  of ~0rkers.I~  The solution to this problem 
implies  that,  if  the  productivity  of  the  mining  sector  increases,  the  taxes 
or transfers from that  sector increase as well.  The trade-off  arises because, 
while  the policymaker  does not  care  about  miners,  he realizes  that  taxing 
this sector will jeopardize the process of capital accumulation  and therefore 
reduce the productivity  of  labor (i.e.,  his  constituency)  in  the  nontradable 
sector. 
16. It could be argued that there is an insurance component to the extent that the mining sector 
needs the provision of basic infrastructure. If the infrastructure provided is not affected by the fall 
in taxes when prices are low, then the mechanism may smooth out the payment of such services. 
17. Choosing the workers as the target group of the policymaker can be justified in two ways. 
First, it generates a result that is compatible with the evidence on Bolivia. Second, workers are the 
biggest group and are therefore an important source of political legimitization. A formal solution 
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Taxes on mining are important, since this sector is essential in generating 
the resources for capital accumulation, thus affecting growth, The most com- 
prehensive study of Bolivia’s public mining sector concludes, “The origin of 
the operating rules for COMIBOL, maximizing production in the short run, 
was based on the needs of the state of maximizing, also in the short run, the 
availability of income and foreign exchange” (CEMIT, 1989, 40). 
In the model in section 8.3, consider a tax on the production of minerals at 
a rate T.  Solving the optimization problem, the optimal capital stock is now 
so that the tax on mining reduces the capital stock for the economy. 
In the presence of price shocks we expect investment to adjust optimally. 
Fluctuating tax rates may  choke the adjustment to shocks. Morales, Espejo, 
and Chavez (1992)  find mixed evidence on the presence of unit roots for prices 
of major export products. Unit roots may be important because they indicate 
the existence of permanent shocks. A compensating tax increase may induce a 
stock of capital that never is at the optimal level. 
8.3.3 
The importance of coca production for the Bolivian economy cannot be dis- 
missed. As discussed before, it represents an alternative source of foreign ex- 
change that is critical for the capital accumulation process. While the discus- 
sion here is in terms of coca production, the results of this and section 8.3.4 
apply equally to the role of nontraditional exports and foreign indebtedness. 
I capture this by adding a term A to the investment accumulation equation 
(1  3). A represents the resources made available by  coca production. The dy- 
namic equations that describe the optimization problem now become 
The Effects of Coca Production 
and 
Z = A + A[z(l -  4))]P  -  62. 
The dynamics are depicted in figure 8.8. The difference from the previous 
models relies on the possibility of  sustaining a capital accumulation process 
with high consumption shares, even in those cases in which the capital stock 
is very low. Consider an increase in A, which may arise because of legalization 
of  drug production,  lower  enforcement, or  positive  technological  or price 
shocks for coca production. Figure 8.8 shows the implications of this for capi- 
tal accumulation and the real exchange rate. The real exchange rate appreciates 
across steady states on impact. Output increases with the process of  capital 
accumulation, but consumption increases as well, as indicated by a jump in +. 258  Federico A. Sturzenegger 
Fig. 8.8  The economy with coca production 
The current formalization does not allow for steady-state growth, for the 
exogenous contribution of coca production to the process of capital accumula- 
tion becomes insignificant as capital accumulation takes place. 
Notice that the analysis disregards the substitution effect known as “Dutch 
disease.” This nevertheless may be an important issue in the presence of learn- 
ing or irreversibility of investment projects. 
8.3.4  Endogenous Growth Again? 
Assume that the contribution of coca production is Az. In this case it is easy 
to see from the equation of  capital accumulation that the rate of  growth of 
capital will equal A -  6 in steady state. The assumption that the resources of 
coca production increase linearly in the capital stock is very  stringent. How 
likely is it that it will be satisfied? There are two reasons that suggest that this 
condition may be possible and three reasons that suggest it is very unlikely to 
be satisfied. On the positive side we have  some evidence that yields may  be 
improving. The NNICC (1989) estimates the coca-leaf yield to have increased 
from 1.4 metric tons per hectare for the period  1984-88  to about 2.7 metric 
tons per hectare for the period 1990-91.  More important, there has been an 
upgrade in the production process in Bolivia. While initially Bolivia exported 
only coca paste, it now has expanded to the production of cocaine hydrochlo- 
rate, a much more advanced stage in the production process for cocaine. On the 
negative side we have, first, that production is constrained by the availability of 
natural resources (appropriate land) for coca cultivation; therefore it is unlikely 
that increases in physical yields will persist for a long time. Second, the price 
of coca has been decreasing substantially in international markets (a reflection 
of an inelastic demand for cocaine). Godoy and De Franco (1990) show that 
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per kilogram in 1980 to less than $2,000 in 1988. More important, the price of 
coca paste, Bolivia’s main export, fell by a half, from $1,500 to $700 between 
1987 and 1989. Finally, most of the resources obtained from coca production 
are not retained in the country. Doria Medina (1986) estimates that about 80% 
of the value added of cocaine production leaves the country as capital flight. It 
is true that the return to this capital is a component of Bolivia’s GDP as it 
accrues to residents. With open capital markets it may even be possible to 
argue that, if  invested abroad, this capital will obtain a higher rate of return. 
Unfortunately, this is not the case; drug capital is not easily “whitened.” In this 
case, some of this capital flight may be incurred at a loss of rate of return. 
Overall it seems unlikely that coca and derivatives will become an engine 
of growth for Bolivia in the future. Other nontraditional exports-cattle,  soy- 
beans, and gold-will  probably play a more important role than coca produc- 
tion in the near future. 
8.4  Inflation and Growth 
Table 8.4 shows Bolivia’s inflation. The table underscores  a major point: 
Bolivia is not a high-inflation country, with years of extreme inflation in the 
triple digits, such as Argentina, Brazil, or Peru. In this context the hyperinfla- 
tion of  1985 seems a rare occurrence and therefore may have different effects 
and implications than in countries with chronic inflation. 
Regarding TFP the inflation rate seems important in explaining the perfor- 
mance of the Bolivian economy. As inflation increases, the productivity of the 
economy falls. In section 8.2 I estimated the relation between inflation and 
TFP. Figures 8.9 and 8.10 show the efficiency of the Bolivian economy relative 
to that of a situation with no inflation, both for the official GNP and for data 
including the informal sector. The main implication of the graph is the negative 
impact of the high-inflation (hyperinflationary) experience of the mid-1  980s. 
In both cases the data indicate that the economy during 1984-85  operated at 
Table 8.4  Yearly Inflation Rates 
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about 80% of  its potential productivity (and at about 95% during 1983 and 
1986).‘* 
The evidence on the effects of inflation on growth or productivity is not 
entirely new and has been found by many authors for cross-sectional studies. 
Fischer (1991) and Kormendi and Meguire (1985) find a negative relation be- 
tween inflation and growth. Barro (1990a) finds that inflation enters insignifi- 
cantly in the growth equations, but that inflation affects the level of output. 
While the exact measure of the effect of inflation remains controversial, the 
qualitative effect of inflation on economic efficiency is not. Why does inflation 
affect productivity? First, it reduces the use of an efficient transactions mecha- 
nism. This is captured both by  Bailey’s monetary  triangle and in  the shoe- 
leather costs discussed in Fischer and Modigliani (1978). A much more im- 
portant effect of inflation comes from the disorganization of  the production 
system. Ball and Romer (1992) and Tommasi (1992) have suggested that high 
inflation has negative effects on economic efficiency because agents decide to 
gather less information, as inflation reduces the informational content of prices 
through an increase in the variability of relative prices. In equilibrium the price 
system is less efficient in allocating resources, and more inefficient producers 
remain in the market. Another dimension in which inflation affects efficiency 
is by affecting agents’ time allocation. De Pablo and Martinez (1989) comment 
that “in Argentina, CEOs are so busy that they don’t have time to work.”  In 
Sturzenegger and Tommasi (1992) in the context of a Schumpeterian model of 
growth, we discuss how high inflation may use up scarce entrepreneurial time 
for activities such as information gathering or financial activities rather than 
for pursuing growth-enhancing activities.19 
A final and crucial mechanism through which inflation affects productivity 
is the financial sector. The financial sector allocates savings to investment proj- 
ects, monitors their execution, and provides working capital for firms. At the 
same time it is strongly affected by market imperfections arising from adverse 
selection problems and moral hazard issues. If inflation increases the variabil- 
ity of relative prices, these two problems are aggravated by an increase in the 
inflation rate. 
Table 8.5 shows the amount of financing provided by the banking system as 
a percentage of GDP, and the percentage of this financing provided by com- 
mercial  and  specialized banks,  as opposed  to the  central bank.  The total 
amount  of  financing  fell  drastically  with  hyperinflation  but  has  recovered 
since. This is clear reflection of how the moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems become more acute in the presence of high inflation. This in turn 
affects productivity adversely. A final reason why the financial sector becomes 
less efficient in times of high inflation is understood by  looking at the third 
18. This may be an overestimation due to widespread excess capacity induced during the same 
19. See also De Gregorio (1991, 1992); Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992). 
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Table 8.5  Financial Indicators 
Savings/  Total Financing/  Commercial Banks/ 












































Source: Banco Central de Bolivia, Annual Memory (1990) 
column of table 8.5. During hyperinflation the public sector became a net bor- 
rower in financial markets.  In  1985 commercial banks  lent about  the same 
amount to the public sector as they did to the private sector. This is a develop- 
ment not unique to Bolivia; Argentina, for example, experienced a similar pro- 
cess during the late 1980s. More recently the proportion of total lending pro- 
vided  by  commercial and  specialized  banks  has increased  substantially  as 
compared to the prehyperinflation period. This is a positive development since 
it ensures better allocation of investment projects. 
Inflation has been shown to have important negative effects on productivity. 
Is it possible to argue that it has a positive effect? I believe there are two im- 
portant reasons that suggest this may be the case. In particular, hyperinflation 
has developed the financial sector considerably and has allowed fiscal reform 
to take place. I discuss each of these developments in turn. 
The development of  the financial sector has two somewhat related objec- 
tives. First, it allocates savings to investment and therefore performs a critical 
role in the growth process. Second, it becomes a hedge against high inflation. 
The hyperinflation period was accompanied by  strong development of  finan- 
cial institutions,  a process that is common to all high-inflation experiences. 
While some of  that  development  certainly  reverses  after  price  stability  is 
achieved, it is possible to argue that in the new equilibrium the total use of 
financial instruments is greater. In the presence of fixed costs (and low mar- 
ginal costs) to the use of  financial instruments, the high-inflation period may 
have brought an important fraction of consumers to the financial sector. These 
do not exit automatically when inflation falls. These hysteresis effects are sup- 
ported by two basic empirical facts: (1) money demand has not increased to 
prestabilization levels, and (2)  the financial sector exhibits strong dollarization 
of financial instruments (see Dornbusch, Sturzenegger, and Wolf 1990). 
Figure 8.11 shows some of these developments. Total liquidity fell during 263  Bolivia: From Stabilization to What? 
hyperinflation and has recovered somewhat since. But notice that the recovery 
is in indexed assets, M4 -  M1, rather on monetary holdings. Hyperinflation 
has therefore played a role in changing the relative composition of monetary 
holdings in favor of indexed assets in the financial sector. The total amount of 
M4 is today higher than at the beginning of the  1980s, and this recovery has 
been made possible by the development of new financial instruments induced 
by inflation. These instruments have taken the form of dollarized indexed de- 
posits. 
The second positive effect of high inflation is the readjustment of the politi- 
cal scenario. Drazen and Grilli (1990) and Velasco (1992) have stressed that 
extreme-inflation experiences may be a catalyst for change and induce the po- 
litical support for reform. They show that, though inflation is costly, the fact 
that reform  is made possible may make inflation, even hyperinflation, desir- 
able. Labin and Sturzenegger (1992a, 1992b) have shown that, in addition to 
making reform acceptable, inflation may  have strong income distribution ef- 
fects, which should not be disregarded when evaluating the “benefits” of hy- 
perinflation. Because inflation is more painful for the agents who do not have 
access to the financial  sector, these groups eventually  lose in the bargaining 
process that  characterizes  a  stabilization  program.  The income  distribution 
implications may  be long-lasting. In  general, it seems difficult to argue that 
hyperinflation can be desirable, but is undeniable that, once the costs of infla- 
tion become overwhelming, reform is implemented. 
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These two developments allow the possibility of long-lasting stability. Any 
deviation from strict fiscal balance,  in the presence of a dollarized  financial 
sector (and very low holdings of domestic currency), would immediately trig- 
ger hyperinflation. The risk of this outcome is what makes the current program 
of fiscal austerity sustainable from a political point of  view. 
8.5  Poststabilization Productivity 
8.5.1  Stabilization and Productivity 
Stabilization is considered the main asset of the Bolivian economy. The Es- 
trategia de Desarrollo Econdmico y  Social, 1989-2000  claims: “The perma- 
nent control of  inflation constitutes  a basis for economic growth and for the 
long-term policies considered in the strategy for economic and social develop- 
ment. Keeping price stability has maximum priority in this strategy, helping in 
achieving the objectives of  improving the international competitiveness of the 
Bolivian economy, of  maintaining consistently an equilibrium in the balance 
of payments, and using investments efficiently” (Ministerio de Planeamiento y 
Coordinacion  1989,43). 
This statement reflects the current belief in Bolivia. Notwithstanding  this, 
we know that growth has been slow to return, and income per capita has re- 
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mained at best stagnant (see figs. 8.1 and 8.2). Productivity, as measured by 
TFP, has remained stable at a level similar to that of  1985. This seems to con- 
tradict the previous result that the reduction in inflation has boosted productiv- 
ity at 20%; the additional factor to be considered is the price of  tin. Prior to 
the outset of the debt crisis Bolivia suffered a drastic reduction in the price of 
tin, its main export product. The price of tin (dollars per pound) fell in nominal 
terms from 7.61 in  1980 to 6.39 in 1981 and 5.78 in  1982, and in 1985 from 
5.38 to 2.57. Figure 8.12 shows the nominal price of tin, and figure 8.13 shows 
the contribution of  tin to TFP. As can be seen, between 1985 and  1986 the 
economy experienced a drastic decline in productivity due to this channel. De- 
creased inflation managed to counteract this decline. The overall effect was to 
leave productivity virtually unchanged. (In the case of  data for the informal 
sector, TFP actually increases after 1985; i.e., stabilization more than compen- 
sated the decrease in productivity induced by the fall in tin prices.) 
Compare Bolivia’s experience in the  1950s. The stabilization program of 
1956 was as successful in halting inflation as the 1985 stabilization. But as can 
be seen from table 8.2, it was eleven years before productivity again reached 
the value achieved in 1956. It did so due to the increase in mineral products, 
an event completely exogenous to policy variables. The outlook for the 1990s 
appears more favorable. Even though the price of tin plunged after 1985, pro- 
ductivity has remained constant or has slightly increased. 266  Federico A. Sturzenegger 
8.5.2  Structural Reform and Productivity 
The stabilization program also implemented a sweeping reform in trade and 
financial markets (see Morales and Sachs 1989). In order to show the effects 
of these reforms on the economy, an independent measure of productivity was 
estimated  for different  industrial  sectors.*" Figure 8.14 shows  the  average 
yearly increase or decrease in productivity between  1986 and 1989 for a num- 
ber of industrial sectors. The sectors are numbered following the Bolivian clas- 
sification  (see appendix).  I  chose industrial sectors not related to mining  in 
order to discuss the implications beyond the effect of mineral prices on produc- 
tivity. In addition  I  have used the period  1986-90  in order to avoid the big 
fluctuations induced by hyperinflation. The estimates are computed using data 
on total employment,  value added, and investment by  industrial  sector. The 
employment data allowed computation of the labor share, while from invest- 
ment a measure of the capital stock was estimated. Consumption of electricity 
was used as a proxy, though very imperfect, of capacity utilization. (For a more 
detailed description of the corresponding sectors and methodology, see the ap- 
pendix.) Despite the assumptions, no strong productivity increase reveals itself 
clearly. Figure 8.14 shows that only seven out of seventeen sectors experienced 
a positive  productivity shock during this period. There is no clear pattern of 
industry type in which sectoral productivity has been particularly boosted. The 
upper range of manufacturing starting in the 360s (nonmetallic products) and 
381 (metallic products) seems to be the most favored. On the other hand pro- 
ductivity in the chemical industry (350s) seems to have uniformly deteriorated, 
sector 356 (plastic products) exhibiting the largest drop in productivity.  It is 
difficult to infer much from these numbers, except that there is no clear upward 
trend in productivity arising from the current reforms. This study has the virtue 
of finally measuring these effects and therefore allowing serious evaluation of 
the structural reform programs. 
The results presented in figure 8.14 are interesting because they suggest that 
the effects of structural adjustment on productivity  (and therefore on capital 
accumulation) may not be immediate. Taking figure 8.14 literally would sug- 
gest that  productivity  actually  deteriorates  in  the  short run,  while Edwards 
(chap.  1 in this volume) shows that structural reform significantly improves 
productivity in the long run. This is important because many countries imple- 
menting structural reform programs expect quick improvements in productiv- 
ity  as a consequence of  structural  adjustment.  Combining these  two results 
suggests the existence of  a J-curve to structural adjustment.  A J-curve may 
exist for two reasons. 
First, there  is a need  for industrial  reconversion  when  relative  prices are 
changed. In the presence of irreversible investments this may lead to decreases 
20. Because industrial sector price indices are used, the relative price measure problem is non- 
existent in these estimates. 267  Bolivia: From Stabilization to What? 
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in productivity as firms use less than optimal production techniques to accom- 
modate their equipment to the new production mix. The striking decrease in 
tin prices, for example, will induce a significant reconversion of industrial pro- 
duction. Such a reconversion is basically equivalent in the context of irrevers- 
ible investments to a loss of part of the capital stock. If the price of tin falls to 
zero, for example, all the investment specific to tin production losses its value. 
True enough, much of the equipment or the training of the labor force will be 
substituted into other areas of  production. But as the experience of  Eastern 
Europe suggests, this is not a painless process and entails an important de- 
crease in the total level of output. 
Second, there is the issue of partial reform. When only some sectors of the 
economy  are  deregulated, distortions can  be  exponentiated. For  example, 
imagine that wood is used both for boxes and for house construction. Say that 
initially the price of  wood  is regulated  and  equal across sectors, but with 
chronic excess demand. The government, in its attempt to deregulate, decides 
to free the price of  wood used for house construction. Immediately the price 
of wood for housing purposes will jump, and no more wood will be allocated 
to production of boxes. Of course this may have very negative effects on the 
distribution process for other products and a significant negative effect on total 
productivity. Both mechanisms are at work. The experience of East Germany, 
which completed its reform quickly and across the board, suggests that the 
industrial reconversion hypothesis cannot be easily dismissed. 268  Federico A. Sturzenegger 
What the numbers indicate from the “model” case of Bolivia is that poli- 
cymakers should not expect wonders from price liberalization or trade reform. 
Even less should they expect important effects in the short run. 
8.6  Other Important Issues 
We turn now to the discussion of additional factors to consider when evalu- 
ating the growth possibilities of the Bolivian economy. These include the pos- 
sibility of development traps, the importance of  human capital, the role of the 
financial sector, the importance of  “animal  spirits,” and income distribution 
considerations. 
8.6.1  Development Traps 
The J-curve of  structural reform can have long-run  detrimental effects on 
the level of output in the presence  of development traps, as it may  shift the 
economy to a  completely  different  equilibrium. Azariadis  (1  992) has sug- 
gested that development traps are very likely to appear once we depart slightly 
from the traditional assumptions of neoclassical growth models. For develop- 
ment traps to appear, the savings rate must increase very rapidly with the level 
of income, so that it is possible to sustain a high level of capital accumulation 
(because  then income and savings are high) but  also a low  level of  capital 
accumulation (where both income and savings are low). This may happen due 
to externalities (increasing returns to scale) or to saving behavior differing be- 
tween capital and labor owners (the traditional renditions for the existence of 
development traps), but also to Leontief technologies (because factor payments 
change drastically beyond a certain level of the capital stock), subsistence con- 
sumption levels, and endogenous population growth. The presence of develop- 
ment traps makes a compelling argument for government intervention. This 
argument was implicitly behind  many  development  programs  like the “big- 
push” ideas during the postwar period. A consensus on whether these programs 
work is still to be achieved. I return to this point below. 
Figure 8.15 shows the drastic decline in the capital stock per capita during 
the 1980s. The capital stock, estimated by Huarachi (1988), does not include 
capital  gains and losses implied  by  changes in relative prices. Therefore it 
probably  underestimates  the decline in the level of the capital stock experi- 
enced during the 1980s. 
The development trap model  suggests that a collapse in the capital  stock 
will lead to such impoverishment that savings and capital accumulation  will 
fall  even  further. The average investment rate for  1972-77  was  16.31% of 
GDP; the corresponding  investment figures for the 1980s are shown in table 
8.6. While investment has fallen (a reflection of the collapse of mineral prod- 
ucts, the shrinking of the government, and hyperinflation), the collapse has not 
been massive. Additional evidence is presented in figure 8.7, in which we see 
that the capital contribution has recovered extremely quickly (at least as com- 
pared with the  1956 stabilization). Due to this recent recovery of investment 269  Bolivia: From Stabilization to What? 
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Fig. 8.15  Capital stock per capita 
Source: Based on data from Huarachi (1988). 
rates, it is safe to argue that there is no serious evidence of a development trap 
in the case of Bolivia. 
8.6.2  Human Capital 
The role of human capital has been emphasized in the new growth literature 
as a potential source of  long-run growth. The highly educated labor force in 
Korea, Mexico, and Brazil has been argued to be an important element in ex- 
plaining  those  countries'  growth  performance.  Estimates  in  cross-country 
growth regressions have reinforced the notion that human capital accumulation 
is fundamental for growth. Barro (1991) estimates that an increase in 10% of 
the enrollment ratio in secondary education increases the growth rate by 0.3%. 
Similarly, for primary education the growth rate increases by 0.25%. These 
numbers suggest that a strategy of development of human capital resources is 
necessary and should be recommended. 
Table 8.7 shows the evolution of some human capital indicators. The table 
shows that progress was made even during the 1980s. Still, these improvements 
seem not to have spurred any substantial growth, so the question remains, why 
did Bolivia not attain significant growth during the 1980s, when illiteracy rates 
fell by 50%.2' 
21. Human capital indicators were not included in the regression analysis because of the scat- 
tered nature of  the data. Still, I have shown that the other variables accounted for ahout 80% of 
the variability of TFF'  and that this TFP was a stationary series. Both elements indicate that it is 
unlikely that human capital has played a very significant role. 270  Federico A. Sturzenegger 
Table 8.6  Investment Rates 
Investment Rate  Investment Rate 
Year  (% of GDP)  Year  (% of GDP) 
1980  14.25  1985  9.48 
1981  13.77  1986  9.47 
1982  10.24  1987  9.72 
1983  7.94  1988  9.66 
1984  10.43  1989  10.14 
Sources: Banco Central de Bolivia and Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas 
Table 8.7  Human Capital Indicators 
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Most growth models that discuss the role of  human capital (in particular 
Lucas 1988) assume a stock of human capital that is passed on, accumulating 
forever, from parents to children. But education and knowledge are not similar 
to physical endowments and do not accumulate automatically, as they are con- 
strained to an individual person and disappear with him or her. In school we 
spend most of our time studying what our parents, and their parents, had to 
study: how  to learn and write.  If  this  is true,  we  should not  expect human 
capital to increase significantly through time and become a thriving force of 
economic development, except for countries experiencing quick progress  in 
literacy and enrollment rates. Even so, it is not clear whether these indicators 
properly capture progress in human capital development. 
The literature has  stressed two measures of  human capital,  average level 
(because it potentiates interactions and therefore individual productivity) and 
total level (because one profits from a general externality). Here I claim that 
the distribution of the human capital is important as well. Figure 8.16 shows 
the distribution of  basic services and some human capital indicators by lan- 
guage spoken. I divide the population into Spanish, bilingual, and native (Ay- 
mara and Quechua) speakers. The first four categories represent basic services, 271  Bolivia: From Stabilization to What? 
the last five education indicators. As can be observed, there is a major differ- 
ence among language groups. If  one group lags behind in its human capital 
skills, then the economy will have to adjust to the human capital of that group 
to interact at all with those agents. Imagine two agents who want to communi- 
cate in writing. If one does not know how to read and write, there is no point for 
the other to improve his literary skills. Distribution matters, and the production 
function in human capital models should perhaps have a term that resembles a 
Leontief production function (F(K, L, H)  where H = min(h,, h2)).  If  this is 
correct, a basic implication is that more effort should be made to homogenize 
the provision of human capital across different social groups. 
8.6.3  Financial Markets 
Growth performance cannot be independent of financial markets. The pro- 
cess of capital accumulation cannot be supported if there are no mechanisms 
that allow savings to be allocated into investment projects. If  savings are not 
intermediated through the financial sector, the chain between savings and capi- 
tal accumulation underscored in the neoclassical growth theory is broken, and 
there is no possibility of  growth. The distinction that is relevant here is that 
between a “storage” and an “investment” economy. If people save by  storing 
goods, this does not allow buildup of the capital stock, and growth will not 
happen; it is necessary then to transfer the savings from storage to the financial 
sector. In this sense the long-run effects of hyperinflation may be very positive. 
100  , 
80 i 
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Fig. 8.16  Language spoken and social indicators 
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By developing the financial sector, ever-increasing savings are intermediated 
to productive activities.** 
Both interest rates, that is the incentive to save, and the characteristics of the 
institutional  system are fundamental  for this transmission  process.  High re- 
serve requirements  will reduce the amount of credit; regulated interest rates 
will reduce the incentive to save. Savings have fallen since the collapse of tin 
prices and the stabilization program (see table 8.5), and while there is a steady 
recovery, the level of savings remains well below historical averages. Low sav- 
ings may be a reflection of expectations of transitory low levels of  income. 
Other institutional arrangements also contribute to low savings. The Aymara 
communities, for example, have implicit  (informal)  arrangements  by which 
those individuals with unexpectedly  high income (unexpected good harvest) 
have to transfer some of their income to the less fortunate. These schemes are 
possibly  welfare  enhancing, as they permit avoiding very low consumption 
levels, but they also induce a lower degree of overall savings.23 
8.6.4  Multiplicity and Animal Spirits 
Animal spirits have been emphasized since Keynes and Schumpeter as im- 
portant driving forces of growth and business cycles. Korea, Brazil, and Chile 
are usually portrayed as countries in which the “excitement” of entrepreneurs 
is sufficient to keep the country  growing. Recently,  the big-push  ideas have 
been formalized in the context of imperfect competition  models by Murphy, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1989a, 1989b). The idea is simple: in the presence of 
imperfect competition, pecuniary externalities matter. If the level of activity is 
believed to be low, then it does not pay to finance high levels of fixed invest- 
ment, which in turn contributes to keeping output low. An alternative equilib- 
rium is one in which everybody believes output will be high, investments look 
ex ante profitable, and entrepreneurs  finance high investment levels. This in 
turn sustains the high output level. In addition to development issues there is 
some evidence  on the relation  between  animal spirits  and  business  cycles. 
Farmer and Guo (1992) have shown that fluctuations in consumer confidence 
permits replication of most of  the characteristics of  business fluctuations for 
the United States. 
What assessment can be made of this mechanism? The multiplicity story is 
true in the presence  of effective lack of  demand, and therefore  may be true 
only for closed economies. A small open economy cannot face an effective 
lack of demand. But for primary products, such as Bolivia’s mineral exports, 
the argument does not hold (even taking into account that the Tin International 
22. In addition, it has recently been argued that financial development allows better information 
23. Those individuals who are successful and do not abide by these social rules are in general 
revelation and therefore better decisions (see Greenwood and Jovanovic  1991). 
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agreements and the bilateral negotiations with Argentina regarding gas exports 
provide some imperfect competition characteristics even to these markets.) 
In one dimension the model may, nevertheless, be relevant. This dimension 
includes the issue of capital repatriation. Dornbusch (1990) develops a model 
in which there is multiplicity in the rate of returns on capital, depending on the 
degree of capital repatriation. 
The issue is polemic because it leads to recommendation  of extensive gov- 
ernment support  for investment projects,  while extensive evidence in Latin 
America indicates that these policies are very negative in the long run. Long 
periods of high subsidies have allowed the existence of a protected and ineffi- 
cient industrial sector. The reason is that protective policies are time inconsis- 
tent (Tornell 1991) and affect the incentives of firms. If the subsidy will always 
be there, no incentive exists for becoming efficient. 
8.6.5  Development Paths 
Ed Learner  (1987) has coined the expression  “paths  of  development”  to 
characterize the evolution of output and factor prices as factor accumulation 
takes place. In standard neoclassical growth models there is only one path of 
development, and that is with capital accumulation and increasing real wages. 
If the model allows for more than two factors of production and more than one 
good, then the evolution of real wages and the return to real factors of produc- 
tion may not be monotonic. 
For Bolivia, figure 8.17 shows a triangle of factor endowments. It represents 
all possible combinations  of land, labor, and capital the economy may have. 
The endowment of  factors  of  production  will change as development takes 
place. 
The economy can produce two industrial commodities (which do not use 
land): a labor-intensive and a capital-intensive  good. The economy can also 
produce a good called “cattle,” which uses only land and labor, or a good called 
“coca” or soybeans, which uses the three factors of production. The exact loca- 
tion of  the corners depends on technology,  and the partition of  the triangle 
depends on final goods prices (see Learner  1987). In the upper-left triangle 
capital is very scarce and both cattle and coca are produced; the return to capi- 
tal is very high. In the lower-right triangle capital is very abundant, and only 
coca and the capital-intensive industrial products are produced; the return to 
capital is relatively low. A path of development following the arrow indicates 
an increase in capital and in landllabor ratio. Real wages in general increase 
along this development path but fall in the transition from the upper-left trian- 
gle to the next. The composition of the production mix now supports a lower 
real wage. It is not unlikely that this development path will find strong political 
opposition. For Bolivia this is a critical issue because the development of the 
economy has been characterized by an increase in the importance of  the low- 
lands, and therefore by  an important change in relative factor endowments, 
with an increase in the endowment of arable land. 274  Federico A. Sturzenegger 
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Fig. 8.17  Paths of development 
8.6.6  Income Distribution 
It has been argued in our discussion of human capital that Bolivia presents 
sectorial and ethnic segmentation. In addition income distribution is very re- 
gressive. Lorenz curves have been computed for 1982, 1985, and  1988. The 
distribution of  income seems to look rather constant across time, especially 
between 1982 and 1988. In both cases the poorest 30% of the population earns 
about  10% of  income and the poorest 50% of  the population earns 20% of 
income. In 1985 the richest 5% had doubled its income relative to 1982, but 
this increase seems to have faded as stability consolidated. This strong effect 
of  inflation on income distribution is consistent with the findings in Cardoso, 
Paes de Barros, and Urani (chap. 5 of this volume) for BraziLZ4 
Perotti (1990) stresses the relation between income distribution and human 
capital formation. In poor societies a very regressive income distribution may 
make the accumulation of  human capital impossible for wide sectors of the 
population. The economy then finds it impossible to take off. Inequality also 
feeds into the political process by calling for radicalization and transfers. If this 
leads to higher capital taxes, it may reduce equilibrium growth, as suggested in 
Alesina and Rodrik (1991) and Persson and Tabellini (1991). The argument is 
that very unequal societies will tend to have higher taxation of capital; this in 
turn will translate into less growth. 
24. Extreme inflation tends to deteriorate income distribution because some agents in the econ- 
omy do not have access to financial adaptation technologies. See Sturzenegger (1992a, 1992b). 275  Bolivia: From Stabilization to What? 
Recently Bolivia has followed the trend in Latin America toward more mod- 
erate economic policy, and political polarization is not a major threat at the 
moment. This has also been helped by the changes in the world and in other 
Latin American countries, which tend to suggest the possibility of successful 
reform programs. But countries also experience inverted-U Kuznets curves of 
income  distribution;  how  long  political  moderation  will  last  is  an open 
question. 
Income distribution has certainly been a major concern in Bolivia’s policy 
making. Land reform was a major political event that still accounts for most of 
the support received by the MNR. Unfortunately, land reform did not improve 
income distribution  significantly. When  in power, the MNR implemented  a 
promised land reform by which estates in the altiplano were divided and allo- 
cated to individual families. Landowners were compensated with large estates 
in the (at that time) underdeveloped  area of Santa Cruz. Unfortunately, this 
meant that peasants were constrained to remain at a single location in the alti- 
plano, which cannot support a family all year long. Indians used to move dur- 
ing the winter to the valley, or yungas, which is better for winter agriculture. 
Anthropologists point to the discontinuous space conception of Aymara Indi- 
ans, who were used to this migration process. Land reform prevented this mi- 
gration from taking place, and poverty therefore increased significantly in the 
altiplano. 
8.7  Conclusion 
Given the facts discussed in section 8.6, can something be done to stimulate 
the sluggish growth performance of the Bolivian economy? 
Godoy and De Franco (1991) argue that Bolivia has to rediscover itself. But 
what does that mean? Does it mean extensive government intervention, strong 
laissez-faire, or a balance of both? Latin America and the world in general have 
recently undergone a major transformation in terms of acceptable economic 
policies. A shift toward free markets and international integration, pioneered 
by Chile and Mexico, followed by Bolivia, Argentina, and to a lesser extent 
other Latin American countries, is generally attributed to three main causes: 
(1)  exhaustion  of  a  given  economic  model  as  represented  by  the  import- 
substitution, inward-orientation,  high-deficit  strategies of  the past  (see Vial 
1992); (2) ideological change induced by exogenous factors, such as the rela- 
tive success of the economic policies of the Reagan and Thatcher administra- 
tions and the collapse of communism (see Cardoso’s chapter in Vial 1992); (3) 
implementation of International Monetary Fund and World Bank reform pro- 
grams. 
These three factors are relevant in the real world, and Bolivia has not been 
immune to any of them. Therefore the prevailing mood is one of minimal gov- 
ernment control and regulation. This mood has been reflected in many coun- 276  Federico A. Sturzenegger 
tries through widespread programs of  privatization and deregulation. While 
Bolivia was a pioneer in macroeconomic reform, it has so far been unable to 
launch a significant privatization program. This can be an important drawback 
if  partial reforms are important but has given Bolivia time to learn from the 
hasty privatization attempts of its neighbors. In Argentina privatization seems 
a desperate attempt to signal a change of policy rather than an effort to increase 
the efficiency of the economy; that is, privatization is taking place without any 
regulatory framework and with extensive monopoly concessions granted to the 
new owners. It is likely that there will be efficiency gains as principal-agent 
problems and the level of corruption decline significantly. But the current situa- 
tion will lead to major departures from optimal pricing which Bolivia should 
try to avoid. 
Barro (1  990b) has emphasized the relation between government infrastruc- 
ture and growth. He claims a nonlinear relation between the two variables. If 
infrastructure is very low, there is a positive association between infrastructure 
and growth, while beyond a certain threshold the relation runs in the opposite 
direction because the tax burden on the private sector more than outweighs the 
benefits of a larger infrastructure. Government spending has been historically 
allocated to subsidies, inefficient projects with no clear public service compo- 
nent, and administrative bureaucracy. The challenge of the new leadership is 
to allocate the properly financed (i.e., not with monetary creation) government 
resources to badly needed public goods and infrastruct~re.~~  The government 
should continue its program of structural reform, but not allow the current tide 
of minimalist government to interfere with the realization that it has, through 
the building of infrastructure, a significant role to play in increasing Bolivia’s 
productivity. To some extent this message seems to be taken into account. Table 
8.8 shows the percentage of GDP allocated by the nonfinancial public sector 
to capital spending. The recovery is healthy, bringing capital spending back 
to the levels of the early 1980s, though not yet making up for years of low 
capital spending. 
A development policy might possibly use alternative models of development 
such as the Japanese and Korean. Contrary to mainstream thought, I believe 
that the main factor behind the strong growth performance of these economies 
is not industrial targeting and R&D but the existence of tight links between 
firms and the banking sector. In Japan the keiretsu is an industrial conglomerate 
that, headed by  a financial institution,  owns and controls a wide variety of 
vertically and horizontally integrated firms. This system (similar to the Korean 
jaebuls) may provide implicit insurance and allow a reduction in the strong 
level of asymmetric information present in credit markets, thereby deblocking 
and allowing implementation of profitable projects, which a completely decen- 
tralized market cannot achieve. Of course, this institutional framework cannot 
arbitrarily be put in place. There is not even a compelling argument for think- 
25. For example, it takes, even today, two days to travel from La Paz to Santa Cruz. 277  Bolivia: From Stabilization to What? 
Table 8.8  Capital Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP 
Capital  Capital 
Year  Spending  Year  Spending 
1980  1.39  1985  3.34 
1981  6.10  1986  4.58 
1982  5.93  1987  5.34 
1983  4.24  1988  6.84 
1984  3.13  1989  5.81 
Source: Unidad de Anilisis de Politica Economica. 
ing that it may be appropriate to Bolivia. In Japan it appeared as a historical 
derivation of the zaibatsu, and there may be important thresholds both in size 
and in endowment of human capital that may make the system work. Whether 
these institutions would spring up from decentralized markets is yet to be seen 
and is an important topic for further research, as are the mechanisms by which 
the government could help in its implementation. 
I have stressed the importance of financial institutions and of financial sector 
development in transforming a stagnant storage economy into a growing capi- 
tal  accumulation  economy. Much of  the work has been  done by  the high- 
inflation experience of the mid-1980s. It is the task of the government not to 
mingle with the financial sector to the point where some of these gains are lost. 
I have also stressed the important negative effects of inflation. Maintenence of 
stabilization  should also be  considered a priority  for the government, even 
more so in the presence of a very dollarized financial sector. Finally, I have 
stressed the need to homogenize the provision of human capital across agents, 
and have pointed to possible income distribution problems along the current 
development path; the government should be active in neutralizing and com- 
pensating some of these changes. Bolivia can spare some active redistribution; 
it cannot afford to have its development path blocked. 
Appendix 
Proof of Tax Policy 
For the model of section 8.3 the policymaker maximizes workers income, 
('41) 
subject to the budget constraint of the government that includes taxes either on 
consumption (a)  and on mining production (T), 
('42)  g = $B($z>" i-  ?A((1 -  +)z)~. 
I"  = (1 -  a)B(l -  *)(+z>"  + g, 278  Federico A. Sturzenegger 
The first-order conditions of this problem, assuming an interior solution, can 
be reduced to the equation 
plus the budget constraint. Implicit differentiation of the system of equations 
(A2) and (A3) gives the result 
Total Factor Productivity 
The computation of TFP for industrial sectors implied the following steps. 
First a measure of real output was obtained by deflating nominal sectoral value 
added by the industrial sector price index. Employment in number of hours of 
labor was provided as data. Total income accrued to that labor was also given 
as data and used to compute the labor share. Computation of capital was by 
the inventory accrual method based on the investment figures provided for the 
corresponding  years. Adjustments  were  made to account for the  change  in 
number of  firms surveyed each year. Once both capital and labor shares are 
computed, TFP computation is straightforward. The numbers presented are the 
average for the periods and sectors considered. 
The sectors are 
3 11/2 Food products 
3 13  Beverages 
314  Tobacco 
321  Textiles 
3211  Apparel 
322  Clothing 
324  Shoes 
331  Wood products 
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Comment on Chapters 7 and 8  Jacques Trigo-Loubikre 
Comment on Chapter 7 
One of the paper’s main virtues is its recognition of the need for the reform 
process to be steadily pursued for years to come if  the cumulative structural 
distortions of  the Argentine economy of the last few decades are to be cor- 
rected. 
However, while I agree that the reform process will continue for a prolonged 
period, I wonder whether this does not clash somewhat with the conclusion 
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reached  at the end of the paper, that “another devaluation  would . . . risk an 
outbreak  of  another  inflation wave.”  The reasons  for  avoiding  devaluation 
would appear to be rather seductive in the short term; but in the longer-term 
context, which, I repeat, the paper rightly  recognizes, currency appreciation 
may become untenable. All the more so if wage pressures cannot be contained. 
At the same time, the  1992 deterioration in the balance of trade suggests 
that if this situation persists for several financial periods it could become un- 
tenable and will call for corrective measures. Moreover, in the current context 
of globalization of markets, the need to maintain external competitiveness sim- 
ply cannot be ignored; otherwise it could compromise the industrial reconver- 
sion program, 
The paper recognizes the need to continue increasing fiscal savings. It would 
entail an enormous additional effort, since the already approved reform of the 
social security system would involve a 20% increase in budgetary expenditure. 
Nor does the paper mention the need to find a solution to the fiscal deficit 
problems that still persist in some provinces. 
I agree that the strong inflation evident in the service sector is surprising and 
deserves more  thorough  analysis.  Perhaps  the  reason  is that  the  economic 
agents and consumers,  long accustomed  to existing in a climate of  chronic 
inflation, are making no aggressive attempts to bring down prices. I understand 
that Minister Cavallo is constantly inciting the population to negotiate prices 
when they make a purchase or pay for a service, and I am convinced that this 
is essential for promoting consumer awareness. 
Comment on Chapter 8 
Federico Sturzenegger has prepared an interesting study in which he ana- 
lyzes the performance of the Bolivian economy from a historical perspective, 
its  sources  of  growth,  and  particularly  the  role  of  the  mining  and  coca- 
producing sectors. I agree with many of  his arguments and conclusions, but 
would like to touch on a few points where I consider his assertions to be errone- 
ous. I will also touch on some aspects-not  dealt with  in the  analysis, but 
which I feel need to be highlighted in the case of  Bolivia-that  address the 
legitimate concern reflected in the title of the paper. 
The study concludes that political instability has had no significant impact 
on economic  growth. I consider this assessment to be incorrect. The sharp 
decline in the gross domestic product and the high rate of inflation from the 
early to mid-1950s were preceded  by  a period  of great political instability. 
More recently, the hyperinflation  that peaked in 1985 was also largely due to 
political,  social,  and  labor  conflicts,  which  led  Siles Zuazo,  the  president 
elected by  an absolute majority of the votes, to demit office a year before his 
constitutional term was up. 
The paper mentions at several points the impact of coca production on the 
Bolivian economy. It specifically states that the magnitude of the coca econ- 
omy is equivalent to the gross national product. Reference is also made to a 283  Comment on  Chapters 7 and 8 
study that put cocaine production at $2 billion in 1985. Had this been the case, 
Bolivia would never have had a balance-of-payments problem, for at that time 
$2 billion represented four times the amount of exports. 
I believe that the author is confusing the value of coca production with the 
value of cocaine on the streets of New York, which is certainly $2 billion. A 
paper prepared by the Analysis and Economic Policies Department of the Bo- 
livian Ministry of Planning suggests that the inflow of foreign exchange gener- 
ated by  the coca economy amounted to $350 million, which would appear to 
be a more realistic figure. 
While the mining industry’s current and future importance for the Bolivian 
economy is indisputable, I do not share the view that there is no alternative 
sector that could compare to the role played by mining as a generator of foreign 
exchange. The outlook is good for natural gas and for agriculture, such as culti- 
vation of soybeans, sorghum, and cotton in the eastern plains, especially in the 
Department of Santa Cruz, and all the more so if the highway projects and the 
waterway project are implemented. 
Section 8.5, which deals with stabilization, reforms, and productivity, notes 
that, despite reforms in the financial and foreign-trade sectors, the industrial 
sector has not gained in productivity. On the basis of this finding, the author 
suggests that the structural reforms have had little impact on economic devel- 
opment. This assertion is certainly polemic, since the industrial sector has been 
growing at rates of  over 5% since 1987, and because any estimate of capital 
stock must be viewed with great caution. In this regard, there is no explanation 
as to how the capital stock was measured. 
I shall now deal with some of the problems that, to me, partly explain why 
the Bolivian economy, which has been achieving price stability, has still not 
attained high levels of economic growth and why the balance of payments is 
extremely fragile. 
The Bolivian model presupposes that reduction of the role of the state would 
go hand in hand with the strengthening of  the private sector, but this has not 
been the case. Private investment has displayed little momentum. Fixed private 
capital formation represented 5% of GDP in the last five years, whereas it ac- 
counted for 9% in the 1970s. What is the explanation for the attitude of  the 
Bolivian entrepreneur and the foreign investor? 1 shall try to answer this. 
With the change in government, private business stood back and waited, 
since one of the political parties that acceded to power had advocated through- 
out the electoral campaign a complete overhaul of the economic model. 
With the new  government’s renewal of  the ESAF (extended fund facility) 
agreement with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the au- 
thorities sent out the important signal that the reform process would continue 
and that the economic model installed by the previous government was the one 
to follow. The reform process has been slow, however, and some of the ground 
rules that were thought to be permanent have changed over the years. 
For instance, the Law  on  Tax  Reform was  altered with  supreme decree 284  Comment on Chapters 7 and 8 
22555, which granted tax exemption to a substantial segment of the country’s 
economy (small business) and constituted a clear infringement of the principle 
of  universality  of  the tax  system.  Subsequently,  tax  on  the  net  worth  of 
businesses doubled from 1 to 2%, value-added tax rose from 10 to 13%, fuel 
taxes  were  raised  with  an  increase  in  the price  of  gasoline from 30  cents 
to nearly 50 cents a liter, and the tax on beer was also increased. At the same 
time, public  spending began  to mount in order to finance excessive current 
expenditure. 
The rational course would have been to cut down on state bureaucracy and 
refrain from sending out such a damaging signal that the fiscal balance was 
highly precarious.  The precariousness  of  public  finance was confirmed  last 
year when the country failed to meet the fiscal targets agreed upon with the 
International Monetary Fund. According to preliminary information, it appears 
that those targets will not be met this year either. Consequently, the conclusion 
is that the fiscal balance has not been consolidated in the case of Bolivia, which 
is a sine qua non for maintaining internal stability. 
Another change was eliminating the system of export incentives, with the 
promise that they would be replaced with a more rational system. So far this 
has not been done. 
The Bolivian model also accorded great importance to foreign private in- 
vestment as a means of boosting  the economy.  In this connection, a law on 
investments was promulgated, which meted out equal treatment to national and 
foreign investment.  However, apart from one foreign investment to expand a 
gold deposit of a firm already in existence, there have been few foreign invest- 
ments of any significance. This is explained by deplorable experiences such as 
failure to enter into a concrete agreement with a foreign firm to exploit the 
Lithium  Corporation  (LITCO), and the  annulment of  risk-sharing  contracts 
between  the  state and local and foreign mining companies for working the 
Bolivar, Tasna, and Catavi mines. These have sent negative signals to foreign 
and local private investors alike. 
At the same time, structural reforms have continued at a very slow pace. 
There have been delays in bringing in thorough financial reform that would 
help mobilize savings for financing investment funding and credit democrati- 
zation. The Bank Law has been “on the verge of approval” for over two years, 
although the government has a parliamentary majority. Also, the lending rate 
for both local and foreign currency has remained at very high levels, discourag- 
ing private investment. The local currency  lending rate was 54% in October 
1992, while  inflation  was  13% in the  same month.  The dollar  lending  rate 
was 19%. 
Social security reform has been “under discussion for three years,” and a 
proposal to introduce new instruments and mechanisms that would speed up 
the functioning of the stock market has yet to be studied by the financial au- 
thorities. 
Early in 1992 the Reform of the Customs System was approved with much 
difficulty, and the privatization process was launched in the middle of the year. 285  Comment on Chapters 7 and 8 
Comment on Chapters 7 and 8  John Williamson 
Rudiger Dornbusch’s paper gives a graphic description of the sixty years of 
Argentina’s economic decline, from its position as the seventh member of the 
contemporary version of the Group of Seven in the early 1930s to its reputation 
as a case study in economic failure by  1990. The causes of this dismal record 
were defiance of the rules of good economic management in both the micro- 
and macrodimensions: extreme import substitution, excessive regulation, and 
irrational  subsidization on the one hand, and eternal fiscal deficits comple- 
mented by repeated overvaluations on the other hand. The question that Dorn- 
busch poses in his paper is whether the policy changes introduced by Doming0 
Cavallo in the last eighteen months, which have brought such hope to the Ar- 
gentine people, have finally broken the cycle of  decline initiated by  Peron’s 
populism. 
So far as microeconomics  is concerned, the omens look propitious.  The 
opening of the economy to both trade and foreign direct investment, deregula- 
tion, privatization, and now the reform of the social security system, look to 
be as irreversible as they were profound. 
The macro-omens are less reassuring. Dornbusch enthuses that the tax yield 
in terms of dollars doubled between 1989 and 1991, but since table 7.4 shows 
a recovery in the tax yield of only 2.8%  of GDP, to a level only 0.5% of GDP 
higher than in 1985, one has to worry that the doubling of the dollar yield is 
primarily a consequence of the increased dollar value of GDP resulting from 
real appreciation. One must then ask whether the improvement in tax perfor- 
mance is large enough-and  permanent enough-to  have eliminated all need 
for the inflation tax, understanding that the cornerstone of the current macro- 
strategy, the convertibility law that supposedly guarantees a fixed exchange 
rate against the U.S. dollar, excludes any significant future resort to the infla- 
tion tax. 
Dornbusch  argues that real  appreciation  has already-as  so often in the 
past-led  to a serious overvaluation of the peso. His evidence for this proposi- 
tion is hardly conclusive, even though he mentions no less than five measures 
based on two different concepts, four different price indices, and two different 
base periods, which one gathers are supposed to demonstrate overvaluation.‘ 
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1. One can trace changes in the ratio of the price of services to the price of goods-a  proxy for 
the Chicago concept of the real exchange rate, the price of nontradables in terms of tradables- 
from table 7.9. CPI and WPI inflation are presented in figure 7.5; they suggest that Argentina has 
lost a Ic: of  competitiveness, as measured by the more traditional concept of the real exchange rate 
as the relative price of  two national outputs,  in  terms of  the former-though  not  the latter- 
measure since March  1991. Table 7.10 shows two measures of the real effective exchange rate 
calculated by the Central Bank of Argentina, one import-weighted and one export-weighted (with- 
out any statement of the price index utilized, which is apparently a fifty-fifty mix of CPI and WPI), 
both based on the traditional concept of the real exchange rate, and both of which show a large 
real appreciation since the late 1980s. 286  Comment on Chapters 7 and 8 
An assertion that a currency is overvalued in comparison to its fundamental 
equilibrium exchange rate, or some analogous concept, needs to face squarely 
the difficulties of identifying the equilibrium rate. This is not to argue that the 
task of diagnosing overvaluation is impossible, but to urge that it needs to be 
treated seriously rather than dismissed with a few casual statistical compari- 
sons, without even taking the trouble to argue that a particular base period has 
some claim to be considered an equilibrium. 
In fact, Dornbusch’s concern about overvaluation probably is merited. The 
next question that arises is what should be done about it. He offers us five 
alternatives:  do not devalue but tough  it out by following the gold standard 
rules of the game irrespective of cost; reinforce the first strategy of not devalu- 
ing by tightening fiscal policy, thus reducing the danger of a further accentua- 
tion of the overvaluation with its concomitant danger of undermining credibil- 
ity; devalue one last time (as usual); start a crawling devaluation; and complete 
the process of dollarization. He advocates the second or fifth strategy, citing in 
support of his rejection of the devaluation  options a modelzinho drawn from 
his earlier work that makes the point that Kiguel  and Liviatan have empha- 
sized, that an exchange rate-based  stabilization brings  an  initial boom  fol- 
lowed by  the need for a prolonged recession in order to deflate prices back 
to equilibrium. 
I endorse Dombusch’s rejection of the option of  “one last devaluation.” A 
promise of no subsequent devaluations would have zero credibility,  and the 
whole stabilization program would probably collapse if its linchpin were re- 
moved by yet another surprise abrogation of the fixed-rate promise. It is good 
to see Dornbusch  fulfilling  the  professional  duty  that  often  falls  on  prac- 
titioners of the dismal science to warn of the need for blood, sweat, and tears 
rather than nurturing populist hopes that instant activism can be guaranteed to 
get growth going again without painful delays. 
Nevertheless, we also have a duty to minimize pain, something that nowa- 
days we all believe can be promoted by  maximizing credibility. There is in 
my view a strong presumption that pain could be reduced, inter alia because 
credibility could be increased, by complementing further fiscal tightening with 
the initiation of a crawling depreciation.  I think it is quite wrong to suggest 
that the psychology of moving to a crawl would be similar to that of  a step 
devaluation: the change could be debated in parliament prior to its implementa- 
tion, rather than having to take the form of a surprise renunciation of previous 
promises. Adoption of a crawl would mark Argentina’s passage from the un- 
convincing posture of promising undying fidelity to a noncredible promise into 
the ranks of the well-managed Latin American countries like Chile, Colombia, 
and Mexico that recognize that controlling inflation requires more than an in- 
tention to stick with an unchanged nominal anchor. 
Federico Sturzenegger’s paper deals with the country whose experience of 
a successful stabilization that failed to crowd in growth originally provoked 
Dornbusch’s concern with this issue (Dombusch  1989). The paper notes that 287  Comment on Chapters 7 and 8 
the stabilization of August 1985 was followed by a second collapse in the price 
of Bolivia’s principal tradition export, tin, and that recovery has been hampered 
by the illegality of the main nontraditional export, coca (80% of whose foreign 
exchange earnings are reported never to reach the country). The process of 
developing alternative nontraditional exports, on the success of which future 
Bolivian growth  surely depends, merited more systematic treatment than it 
receives in the paper, although there are some indications of hopeful develop- 
ments. 
I have comments on two of the conclusions of the paper. 
I doubt whether we should conclude from the econometric finding that Bo- 
livian productivity  varied  with  the  price  of  minerals,  that  Bolivia’s future 
growth depends on a recovery of mineral prices. Sturzenegger does not offer a 
theoretical explanation for his empirical finding. I would conjecture that it re- 
flects the fact that in the past the Bolivian economy was dominated by mineral 
production, and high prices for major exports permit an economy to operate at 
full capacity which brings a cyclical increase in productivity. If that is indeed 
the explanation, it follows that Bolivia will still have growth possibilities even 
if the mineral sector remains as minor as it has now become (table 8.3 reveals 
that since 1976 tax revenue on the sector has amounted to only 0.1  % of GDP, 
while both legal exports and formal GNP accounted for by minerals have fallen 
below 15%). Successful development of nontraditional exports could provide 
a perfectly satisfactory substitute. 
The most interesting and useful result in the paper seems to me to be the 
estimate of the impact of hyperinflation on productivity. Until I find a superior 
source of evidence, my stylized fact will henceforth be that hyperinflation re- 
duces productivity, and hence output, by around 20%. This interpretation sug- 
gests that output first fell around 20% because hyperinflation was allowed to 
develop, and then failed to recover because the removal of that shock was ac- 
companied by another negative shock-the  collapse in the terms of trade-of 
similar size. It is an interpretation that permits Bolivians some hope that the 
future will be brighter than the recent past. 
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